Way back in January 2012 I was a tech writer for the short lived revival of BYTE magazine as an online-only publication. I had the privilege of interviewing Kent Ekberg to learn about the Sony Mavica prototype analog electronic (not digital, not film-based) camera as he, in his role as a Sony Corporate Planner, introduced it to professional photographers and artists in the US in the summer of 1981. Kent also played a key role in the introduction of CDs, CD-ROMs, and was a product champion for optical discs.
I’m taking advantage of 2025 technologies like Google NotebookLM and Adobe Podcast Studio to revisit our conversation, clean up the recorded audio a little, and provide a captioned video “Audiogram” of our discussion.
Sony Mavica photo attribution: By Morio, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=131924791
Kent Ekberg joined Sony in September 1981 and was a Corporate Planner until he left the company around 1990. His role involved leading the corporate plan for Sony’s non-consumer business, which encompassed nascent computer products, peripheral devices like floppy disks, electronic cameras, and optical disks such as CDs and CD-ROMs.
His key experiences at Sony include:
- The Original Sony Mavica (Magnetic Video Camera):
? Ekberg was closely involved with the Mavica prototype, which was introduced in August 1981.
? A significant part of his job was to demonstrate these prototypes at tradeshows and to major professional clients, including Time-Life, prominent photographers, and artist Peter Max, to understand potential uses for these groundbreaking products.
? He highlighted that in 1981, the concept of a filmless or electronic camera was considered “science fiction”.
? The Mavica was an analog electronic camera that captured still video frames, storing them on a small magnetic “Mavica floppy” disk. He estimated its resolution to be around 640×480 pixels, comparable to VGA quality at the time, which was better than typical video.
? Sony initially introduced the Mavica as a professional product rather than a consumer one, acknowledging the market’s unpreparedness for such technology.
? He conducted one of his first corporate strategic planning studies on the Mavica’s market potential and observed the reluctance of entrenched film companies like Kodak and Fujifilm to embrace new electronic imaging technologies.
? He recounted that demonstrations were often “static” but effective, showcasing the “magic” of instant image capture, printing, and even electronic transmission—a novel capability that allowed photos from overseas to be transmitted to Time-Life in New York for publication.
? Ekberg found the original analog Mavica to be “point and shoot” and easy to use. However, he recognized that for professional photographers, greater sophistication, such as lens adapters for Nikon and Canon lenses, would be necessary.
? The original analog Mavica was not a “runaway product”, and Sony chose not to aggressively market it to consumers, anticipating the eventual emergence of digital technology, an area where Sony initially lacked core expertise compared to Silicon Valley firms.
? Due to the limited number of prototypes (only one or two in the country), he frequently had to coordinate and even “fight” for access to the Mavica for various demos.
- Other Technologies and Strategic Insights:
? Ekberg also worked extensively on CD, optical disc, and CD-ROM technologies, even more so than on Mavica.
? He served as Sony’s product champion for optical discs, navigating standardization challenges (Sony collaborated with Philips to develop the CD and CD-ROM) and taking prototypes to market to explore their applications.
? He played a role in establishing Sony’s disc manufacturing infrastructure, including the first disc plant in the United States.
? He collaborated with companies like Microsoft to legitimize CD-ROM technology, noting the adoption of Office on CD-ROM.
? He observed the resistance of traditional media, such as The New York Times, to embrace electronic formats due to concerns about cannibalizing their existing print business.
? He provided context for the technological landscape of 1981, noting that personal computers, like the newly introduced IBM PC, were not consumer products, and even Sony’s large New York office had very few computers.
? He highlighted the typical product trajectory for high-tech consumer electronics, where innovations often start in professional markets before transitioning to consumer availability
